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ence of the red signal lights so strongly encourages reliance on
them.
In Piquet v. Stiaes, the court barred a plaintiff for failure
to avail himself of the last clear chance in a typical intersec-
tional collision in which the defendant came through the neutral
ground section of a divided boulevard and was struck by the
plaintiff. The doctrine of last clear chance evolved to relieve a
negligent plaintiff of the harshness of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine. The court used it here to bar the plaintiff. It
would seem a more simple approach to hold that this plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence in not keeping a proper
look-out and for not having his car under sufficient control to
stop in time to avoid the defendant; however, the result reached
by the court in finding against the plaintiff on the facts shown
seems unquestionably correct.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
SURETYSHIP
In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Richard, the debtor failed to
meet certain scheduled payments and the creditor did nothing
about it until he called upon the surety after the debtor had
physically departed from the jurisdiction. The surety's plea of
release by reason of a time extension without his consent was
dismissed because the facts did not show any agreement for
valuable consideration which would have precluded the creditor's
right of action for any stipulated length of time. It is sometimes
difficult to evaluate the facts but the court had no difficulty in
this case in concluding that there had been a gratuitous for-
bearance or mere indulgence, and therefore the surety was not
released. There was no dispute about the law, and both sides
agreed that the governing law was stated in the previous case of
O'Banion v. Willis2 (which actually held the other way and with
a strong dissent), but it is surprising that there is no mention
in the court's opinion of Civil Code Article 3063,3 which is the
real basic law for this situation.
7. 198 So.2d 496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 So.2d 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
2. 14 La. App. 638, 129 So. 440 (1st Cir. 1930).
a. "The prolongation of the terms granted to the principal debtor without the
consent of the surety, operates a discharge of the latter."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PLEDGE
Forfeiture of a pledged object is strictly prohibited.4 Judicial
proceedings and public sale constitute the general rule, but there
may be a valid agreement for disposition at private sale. 5 Courts
should be, and they are, very watchful to protect the debtor's
interests against the impatience or cupidity of the creditor who
attempts an oversimplification of his security. In Elmer v.
Elmer' the court prevented the 'creditor from appropriating the
pledged property through the superficial compliance of a private
sale, and provided for future reference some strong guide lines,
such as: "the pledgee occupies a fiduciary relation to the
pledgor . . . the duty of acting fairly and in good faith,"' 7 as
well as "utter disregard by the pledgee of the rights of the
pledgor"' and "a dealing with the property incompatible with
the pledgee's fiduciary character."9 The creditor's purported
private sale to himself was annulled and set aside.
PRIVILEGES
Privileges are automatic security devices provided by law to
give additional protection to certain creditors who are thereby
exempted from the general rule of proration. 10 As such they must
be strictly construed." One of the creditors long favored by
such a preference was the lessor for the payment of his rent. 2
However, the language in these texts is clearly limited to the
lessor of immovable property because the terms used are "predial
estates.. . houses and other edifices," 13 "the house or store,""
"the leased premises '"" and "the rents of immovables.' 6 There
is no provision of law which creates a privilege in favor of the
lessor of movables for the rent due him, and none can be implied
on account of the stricti juris rule of privileges. 7 Accordingly, in
Econo-Car International v. Zimmermans writs of sequestration
and attachment were dissolved because the lessor (or sub-lessor)
4. See Alcolea v. Smith, 150 La. 482, 90 So. 769 (1922).
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3165.
6. 203 So.2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. Id. at 394.
8. Id. at 395.
9. Id. at 396.
10. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3183-3184.
11. Id. art. 3185.
12. Id. arts. 2705-2709, 3217(3), 3218.
13. Id. art. 2705.
14. Id. art. 2707.
15. Id. art. 2709.
16. Id. art. 3217(3).
17. Id. art. 3185.
18. 201 So.2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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of automobiles had no privilege on the automobiles which were
sequestered, 19 nor did the facts support an attachment of the
bank accounts.
2 0
This decision of the court of appeal (reversing the trial
court) is clearly correct and is grounded very firmly and care-
fully on the appropriate Civil Code articles. The Louisiana
lessor's privilege is modeled closely on the French Civil Code,
and the French authorities are to the same effect.2 1
The foregoing analysis of the law does not deny or overlook
the important and extensive modern development of renting au-
tomobiles, large and small construction equipment, and other
movables. However, the present Louisiana law does not grant
these lessors any extra automatic protection in the form of a
preference which would exempt them from the general rule of
proration. Whether a privilege should be created in their favor
is a complex question of interwoven social and economic condi-
tions as reflected in the development of new business practices,
as well as of the effects this would have on other creditors. Mean-
while, it would be a mistake to think of these lessors of movables
as being deprived of protection for the payment of their rents
because there are always the possibilities of pledges (advance
deposits), sureties and bonds, mortgages, and all such conven-
tional security devices as are available to any creditors.
In Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder2 2 the court of
appeal reversed the trial court and held that the Civil Code
privilege for expenses of last illness -3 does not include charges for
hospital board and room, x-ray and laboratory services, drugs,
dressings, oxygen, blood-typing, and transfusion charges. The
court of appeal also held that this was an action to enforce an
open account and therefore was barred by the liberative prescrip-
tion of three years.2 4 The Supreme Court has granted a writ
of review in this case, 25 so further comment will be withheld until
final disposition is complete.
BUILDING CONTRACT PRIVILEGES
The large amount of present-day construction is producing
not only quite a bit of litigation but there are also new kinds
19. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3571, 3575.
20. Id. art. 3541.
21. E.g., 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 2465-2489 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959).
22. 208 So.2d 355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
23. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3191(3), 3199-3204, 3252.
24. Id. art. 3538.
25. 252 La. 178, 210 So.2d 56 (1968).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of legal problems as well as new aspects of older ones. In McGill
Corp. v. Dolese Concrete Co.26 an apartment complex was built
on one lot with a 20-foot servitude of passage for a driveway
on the adjacent lot. The question was whether the materialmen's
privileges covered both lots. It was argued that the situation was
governed by R.S. 9:4816 concerning the construction of two or
more works on adjacent lots and, since the last work on the
driveway had been completed more than sixty days prior to
the filing of the liens, that there was no privilege on that lot.
In interpreting the meaning of this statutory provision, the
court asserted that it was intended for those instances where
a separate building or work was situated on each lot. The court
also concluded that the building and the driveway constituted a
single project, and since there was no recorded contract the case
was governed by R.S. 9:4812 so that the liens were timely filed.
However, they could not affect all of the adjacent lot but only the
lot on which the building was constructed plus the 20-foot serv-
itude of passage over the adjacent lot on which the driveway was
constructed.
This interpretation of the scope of the privilege appears to
be well founded in the purposes of the statute. If the owner of
the building had purchased the 20-foot strip of land it would
certainly be covered by the privilege; since he acquired only a
servitude, and since a predial servitude is an immovable right
susceptible of encumbrance,2 there is no reason why it cannot
be encompassed within the privilege. It would be going too far
to say that the privilege covers the full ownership of the land
because this could result in depriving the owner of his title
whereas he had disposed of only a servitude.
In Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. DeBrueys, 28 a materialmen's
lien which had been timely recorded was erroneously canceled.
The court ordered that it be reinstated with full force and effect
despite the contention that this would do violence to the public
records doctrine. While the public records doctrine is an ex-
tremely important part of the law, it is a mistake to consider it
so sacrosanct as to exclude exceptions. Even the laborers' and
materialmen's privileges under the building contract law are ini-
tially "secret liens" within the delays allowed for their filing.
The decision in the present case is perfectly in accord with the
26. 201 So.2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
27. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 471, 3289.
28. 200 So.2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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long-standing law that the erroneous or fraudulent cancellation
of a mortgage does not alter its validity or its ranking.29
The question of imputation of payments can become the vital
collateral issue in building contract privileges where the con-
tractor is working on several projects and makes occasional pay-
ments to the supplier for materials furnished in connection with
the different jobs. If either the contractor or the supplier could
make the imputations at will, this could place very unfair burdens
on certain owners. Accordingly, where the supplier has received
a payment from a contractor with the knowledge that it came
from a particular job, the imputation must be made first to the
debt incurred in connection with that construction contract;
this enables that particular owner to plead payment not only
as a defense against personal liability (where contractor does
not put up a bond) but also to preclude any lien against his
property.2 0
However, where the contractor of a single project accepted
a payment from the owner "in full settlement," this was no
obstacle to the unpaid subcontractor filing his claim as a lien
against the property.-1
R.S. 9:4812 requires re-inscription within one year to preserve
the lien, but where the property was sold by the sheriff within
the year the claim is referred to the proceeds of the sale and the
lien has its full effectiveness without re-inscription.-
A new and interesting problem was present in the case of
Pringle Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes2 3 A subcontractor,
who had paid his laborers, recorded a claim for the sums thus
paid, and on the ground of subrogation he asserted a laborer's
lien against the property so as to obtain this advantageous
priority. The question is discussed extensively in the opinion of
the court of appeal where this contention was not allowed. Since
a writ of review has been granted 3 4 further comment is with-
held at this time.
29. Zimmer v. Fryer, 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938), and other cases cited.
See also Caumont v. Hickey, 165 So. 488 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936), where court
recognized fraudulent consultation and protected rights of mortgage creditor but
refused to order reinstatement in the records.
30. Maxwell Hardware & Lumber Co. v. Mercer, 201 So.2d 660 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1967) (6 cases) ; Duffy v. Roman, 209 So.2d 502 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
31. Houlemard v. Brierre, 207 So.2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
32. City National Bank v. Sunshine Processing Co., 209 So.2d 161 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968).
33. 208 So.2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
34. 252 La. 267, 210 So.2d 508 (1968).
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CHATTEL MORTGAGE
In First Nat'l Bank in Mansfield v. Lawrence, 5 where the
holder of a second chattel mortgage (on certain drilling rigs)
had actual knowledge of the existence of a prior chattel mort-
gage on the same things, the court decided that the holder of the
first chattel mortgage was relieved of a literal compliance with
the law concerning registry. A writ of review has been granted
in this case ' 6 and further comment is withheld at this time.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Juridical Nature of the Loss of the Right of Action
There are two kinds of ways in which a person may lose his
right of action as a result of failure to exercise it during a speci-
fied period of time.
(1) The first is the ordinary liberative prescription which
causes the release of the debt by being a "bar" to the action, and
it must be pleaded by the debtor.' Thus the defendant's failure
to plead this prescription cannot be supplied by the court - and
there would have to be a judgment for the plaintiff. Even when
the action is barred by prescription, a "natural obligation" still
subsists 3 so that a voluntary payment made thereafter cannot
be reclaimed as "undue."' 4 Furthermore, the ordinary liberative
prescription is subject to interferences with the running of time
through interruption by lawsuit or acknowledgment, 5 and by
reason of suspension on account of the various legal incapacities
of certain individuals, as specified by law.0
(2) The second way in which a person loses a right through
inaction is more rigid and more severe; it is called "peremption"
or "forfeiture." This is not described in the Civil Code, but its
two distinctive characteristics are (a) that the right is abso-
lutely extinguished and ceases to exist-not even as a natural
obligation, and (b) that there can be no-repeat, no-inter-
35. 207 So.2d 907 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
36. 251 La. 1082, 208 So.2d 537 (1968).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3459, 3463.
2. Id. art. 3463.
3. Id. art. 1758(3).
4. Id. art. 2307.
5. Id. arts. 3518, 3520, 3551-3553.
6. Id. arts. 3521-3527, 3554-3555, 3541.
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